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Investigating International Accounting Standard Setting:
The Black Box of IFRS 6

Abstract
This paper examines the role of powerful entities and coalitions in shaping
international accounting standards. Specifically, the focus is on the process by
which the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) developed IFRS 6,
Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources. In its Issues Paper, the IASB
recommended that the successful efforts method be mandated for pre-production
costs, eliminating the choice previously available between full cost and successful
efforts methods. In spite of the endorsement of this view by a majority of the
constituents who responded to the Issues Paper, the final outcome changed nothing,
with choice being retained. A compelling explanation of this disparity between the
visible inputs and outputs of the standard setting process is the existence of a “black
box”, in which powerful extractive industries entities and coalitions covertly
influenced the IASB to secure their own ends and ensure that the status quo was
maintained.

Keywords: IFRS 6; extractive industries; accounting standards.
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1. Introduction
Accounting policies matter to corporations because they shape the distribution of
income, wealth and perceptions of risks (Solomons 1978; Zeff 1978; Solomons
1983; Willmott and Sikka 1997; Zeff 2002). It is now widely accepted that the
development of accounting policies is a residue of political negotiations and
bargaining amongst corporations and a political elite (Beresford 1988; Sikka et al.
1989; Mitchell and Sikka 1993; Mitchell et al. 1994; Mitchell et al. 1998). The
politics of accounting policymaking are given visibility by the operations of the
standard setting bodies, which need simultaneously to accommodate diverse
demands and also secure their own legitimacy by portraying themselves as
pluralistic, rational and objective.

With the expansion of economic globalisation, a considerable body of literature on
accounting policymaking has focused on the processes of the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), essentially a private sector standard setting
body (Ravlic 2000; Casabona and Shoaf 2002; Zeff 2002; Brown 2004; Brown and
Shardlow 2005; Touron 2005; Brown 2006). Some of this literature exposes issues
relevant across sectors and industries, such as accounting for intangible assets
(Kwok and Sharp 2005; Chalmers and Godfrey 2006), financial instruments
(Duangploy 2007; Landsman 2007), and business combinations (Briner and
Fulkerson 2001; Maines et al. 2004). As specialised accounting standards have also
begun to emerge for specific industries or segments, scholars have begun to
examine the standard setting process for banking (Jeffery 2004; Landsman 2007),
insurance (Mansfield and Lorenz 2004; Bodurtha 2005), not-for-profit (Anon 2006;
Kilcullen et al. 2007) and small-medium-sized-business sectors (Sealy-Fisher
3

2006; Woolfe 2007). This paper contributes to this literature by examining the
processes relating to the formulation of International Financial Reporting Standard
6 (IFRS 6) Exploration for the Evaluation for and the Evaluation of Mineral
Resources. This standard is of particular significance to the extractive industries,
which comprise oil, gas and mining companies.

An important issue in extractive industries accounting is the way pre-production
activities, also known as exploration and evaluation activities, are accounted for.
Historically, there have been two methods employed, the full cost method and the
successful efforts methodi. Under the full cost method, all acquisition, exploration,
and drilling costs, including those relating to unsuccessful activities, may be
capitalised and carried forward until such time as they can be written off against
revenue from successful projects (Flory and Grossman 1978). In contrast, under the
successful efforts method, only those pre-production costs that relate directly to
successful projects can be matched against revenue from the successful project
(Katz 1985). While both approaches are based on the historical cost concept of
accounting, the method that produces the most favourable results depends on
whether the reporting entity is small and in its early stages of exploration, or larger
and more able to absorb the cost of unsuccessful efforts (Katz 1985; Van Riper
1994). The full cost versus successful efforts issue first became controversial in the
United States (US) in the late 1960s when the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) sought to narrow accounting alternatives and require oil and gas
companies to reporting according to the successful efforts method (Van Riper
1994). The effect on profits calculated under each method can be substantial; a
recent switch in methods from full cost to successful efforts accounting caused one
4

UK oil producer to restate its profits from $44 million to $22 million (Neveling
2005).

The extractive industries is a sector dominated by global corporations and powerful
extractive industries bodies whose income in many cases dwarfs the gross domestic
product of many nation states (Cortese et al. 2009). The purpose of this paper is to
examine the role these powerful entities and coalitions play in shaping international
accounting standards and recognise that their contributions may not always be
visible but their influence certainly exists and permeates the accounting standard
setting process.

To advance the analysis, this paper is constructed in the following sections. First,
the black box concept is proposed as a means for understanding and examining the
international accounting standard setting process (Hodges and Mellett 2008). This
is followed by a discussion of standard setting and IFRS 6, which contextualises the
IASBii and its processes, presents an overview of the extractive industries and
provides evidence of the enormous economic strength of this sector. The visible
inputs, for example the exposure draft and public comments, are examined in light
of the visible output of the standard setting process, IFRS 6. Concluding comments
reflect on the disconnect between the visible input and visible output and infer the
existence of a black box in the standard setting process within which the unseen
influences of powerful constituents act as a countervailing force against visible
opinion.

5

2. The black box
Much of the extant research on accounting and the extractive industries has been
based on the assumption that “facts” can be gained by observation of consistencies
and causal relationships, which are then assembled into generalisable empirical
patterns of accounting practice (Chua 1986; Mouck 1992; Hopper et al. 1995; Lodh
and Gaffikin 1997; Agger 1998). A multitude of investigations into accounting for
the extractive industries emerged following the FASB’s controversial proposal in
the late 1970s to eliminate the full cost method of accounting for pre-production
activities and require entities to report under the successful efforts method. Many
of these studies examined the market effects of the proposed change in accounting
method (Baker 1976; Amernic 1979; Collins and Dent 1979; Dyckman 1979;
Dyckman and Smith 1979; Lawrie 1986). Other research investigated the
relationship between the choice of the full cost or successful efforts method and
company characteristics such as size, age, exploration aggressiveness and/or
success, and demand for capital (Deakin 1979; Lilien and Pastena 1981). Research
also attempted to predict reasons for switching between accounting methods
(Johnson and Ramanan 1988; Nichols 1993), and tested the relationship between
successful efforts and full cost data and company share price (Berry et al. 1985;
Bandyopadhyay 1994; Bryant 2003; Al Jabr and Spear 2004).

Given the positivist, statistics-based research that has dominated this area, there is
space in the literature for a study of the process of setting an international
accounting standard and the influences that shape IFRSs. It is important that the
process be seen as subjectively created and grounded in social and historical
practices (Hines 1988; Walker and Robinson 1993; Miller 1994; Walker and
6

Robinson 1994). It is important to recognise the efforts of participants within
standard setting processes and their influence over the content of rules developed
and also the institutional environment within which these rules are considered (Zeff
2002; Brown 2004; Brown and Shardlow 2005; Brown 2006).

Hodges and Mellett (2002) provide an example of research into the process of
accounting standard setting. They examined the UK standard setting process and
raised the notion that unseen or hidden influences could also play a role in the
standard setting process. They stressed that investigations should not be restricted to
observable lobbying activity and public submission statements, arguing that extant
accounting standard setting literature did not sufficiently acknowledge influences
that were not publicly visible (Hodges and Mellett 2002). In a follow up to their
2002 study, Hodges and Mellett (2005) conducted a series of interviews and found
that there was considerable discussion between regulators and interested parties
throughout the accounting standard setting process, much of which does not
become part of the public domain. This evidence of informal lobbying supported
their earlier claims that accounting standard setting research should also consider
the unseen influences that occur within the regulatory process (Hodges and Mellett
2002).

Hodges and Mellett (2005) use the “black box” as a metaphor for accounting
standard setting to provide a way of making sense of the complexities of social
interaction that permeate the standard setting process but that are difficult to
determine through empirical investigation (Hodges and Mellett 2008). Standard
setters are viewed as part of an “accounting world” in which constituents and
7

lobbyists interact with the standard setting body to shape the outcome of the
regulatory process (Hodges and Mellett 2008, 3).

The economics literature suggests the regulatory capture hypothesis as a means for
understanding how regulators are persuaded by entities to issue regulations that
benefit the regulated (Posner 1974; Mitnick 1980; Uche 2001). Applied in
accounting research, Walker (1987) used regulatory capture theory to argue that the
profession so heavily influenced the development of the Australian Accounting
Standards Review Board (ASRB) that its research capabilities, Board membership,
procedures, priorities and outputs could not be considered independent of the
accounting profession it was intended to regulate. Also recognising the relevance
of regulatory capture theory in studies of accounting were Mitchell et al. (1994), in
their study of accounting professionalisation, Richardson and McConomy (1992), in
their review of potential theories of accounting regulation., and Roberts and
Kurtenbach (1998) in their examination of CPA lobbying strength.

While regulatory capture theory as proposed by Mitnick (1980) and applied by
Walker (1987) requires direct observation, or “proof”, of the regulatory processes
taking place (or perhaps not taking place), this level of involvement in studies of
accounting standard setting is rarely possible. By identifying the visible inputs to
the process, influential forces that arise within it can be inferred to provide an
explanation of the accounting standard that eventuates (Hodges and Mellett 2002,
2005, 2008). The concept of the black box permits recognition of the socially
constructed nature of accounting standard setting and explicitly recognises that
hidden lobbying activity that occurs, which is more pervasive than that reflected in
8

the public domain (Walker 1987; Walker and Robinson 1994; Weetman et al. 1996;
Rahman 1998; Walker and Mack 1998; Weetman 2001; Hodges and Mellett 2002;
Georgiou 2004, 2005). This approach is particularly useful for the study of
extractive industries accounting which has been a contentious and highly politicised
issue since the FASB proposals in the 1970s (Van Riper 1994). The black box is
presented in Figure 1.
*Insert Figure 1 here*
In this conception, the black box is proposed as an explanation for a standard setting
outcome in cases where there is no apparent connection between the visible inputs
into the standard setting process and the output from the process. It provides a
space in which other unseen pressures can be considered as having influenced the
process. The influences that contribute to the black box may occur some time
before the standard setting process actually begins, for example when setting the
agenda (Cousins and Sikka 1993; Weetman 2001). Visible influences can be found
in public submissions made in response to exposure drafts, while unseen influences
occur covertly as a result of “behind the scenes” lobbying by constituents and
advocacy groups. This type of lobbying activity is well supported in accounting
standard setting literature (Bryant 1981; Brown 1982; Solomons 1983; Sutton 1984;
Tutticci et al. 1994; Van Riper 1994; Walker and Robinson 1994; Weetman et al.
1996; Hodges and Mellett 2002; Zeff 2002; Brown 2004; Georgiou 2004, 2005;
Hodges and Mellett 2005; Cortese et al. 2009).

Hodges and Mellett (2002, 2008) inferred the existence of these unseen influences
by examining the outcome of accounting standard setting processes. The visible
input into the standard setting process, represented by exposure drafts, was
9

examined in conjunction with the visible output, the eventual IRFS. If an
inconsistency was observed or the outcome was contrary to expectations, it was
inferred to be the result of unseen influences occurring within the standard setting
black box (Hodges and Mellett, 2008). The eventual IFRS may be the result of
overt or covert influence. Overt influence is evident when the outcome of the
standard setting process is consistent with the explicit submissions made by
constituents. This implies that there was no visible opposition to the proposals and
submissions or that any opposing players were less significant than those
represented in the responses (Hodges and Mellett, 2008). In contrast, an outcome
affected by covert influence arises when unseen pressures shape the eventual
standard such that the result is contrary to visible input and submissions. Covert
influence may also be a consequence of support for visible input, thereby
reinforcing and strengthening the positions taken by visible participants (Hodges
and Mellett, 2008).

Hodges and Mellett (2008) used this framework to analyse the UK Accounting
Standard Board’s proposal for accounting for contracts under the UK’s Private
Finance Initiative. They chose this example because of the significant potential
implications from the standard and the likely controversy that would pervade the
process of setting it. Further, the proposed accounting treatment was to require
contractual assets and obligations to be either on balance sheet or off balance sheet,
which facilitated the cause and effect analysis of the black box approach. The case
study used by Hodges and Mellett (2008) to illustrate their understanding of the
accounting standard setting process has similarities with the IASB’s extractive
industries project, which is discussed in the following section.
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3. Setting a standard for the extractive industries
The methods of accounting for extractive activities have been the subject of debate
for over forty years. As noted, the US oil and gas industry was at the centre of the
full cost versus successful efforts controversy. Following Middle-East oil embargo
in 1973, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was given the task of
developing accounting standards that would support the nation’s oil and gas
industry (Flory and Grossman 1978). The SEC subsequently delegated
responsibility for setting the standard to the FASB, but retained the right of final
approval (Van Riper 1994; Cortese et al. 2009). The FASB’s exposure draft,
Financial Accounting by Oil and Gas Producing Companies, proposed to narrow
accounting alternatives and require use of the successful efforts method (Flory and
Grossman 1978; Van Riper 1994; Cortese et al. 2009). Following the release of the
exposure draft, an intense lobbying effort was launched by the smaller, independent
oil and gas companies that relied on the full cost method to grow their assets and
attract investment for exploration activities (Van Riper 1994; Cortese et al. 2009).
However, the FASB conducted studies to support its exposure draft and in
December 1977 issued Statement No.19, Financial Accounting and Reporting by
Oil and Gas Producing Companies, which effectively eliminated the full cost
method for financial reporting. Lobbying against the standard continued and in
what has been described as one of the “most intensely politicised accounting
arguments ever” (Van Riper 1994, 64), the SEC eventually withdrew its support for
FASB Statement No. 19 and permitted continued use of either the full cost or
successful efforts method (Flory and Grossman 1978; Smith 1981; Larcker and
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Revsine 1983; Katz 1985; Van Riper 1994; Cortese et al. 2009). The International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC)’s attempt to address this issue at the
international level marks a revisiting of this historical controversy.

In 1998, the extractive industries project was added to the formal agenda of the
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which later became the
IASB. The international prominence, economic influence, and divergent practices
of the extractive industries were listed by the IASC as factors contributing to the
importance of the project, which sought to redress the disparity in accounting
measurement and disclosure practices prevalent in the sector (IASC 2000). An
internationally representative committee was established to lead the project and, in
November 2000, the Extractive Industries Issues Paper was published. Referring
again to Figure 1, the Issues Paper represents the visible input into the process of
setting an international accounting standard for the extractive industries.

One of the Issues Paper chapters sought respondents’ preferences when accounting
for pre-production activities. As a result of the failed FASB standard, US
companies are able to choose between the full cost and successful efforts methods
when accounting for exploration and evaluation activities. Companies in the UK
and Canada may also chose between these methods, while Australian companies
most often report under the area-of-interest method, a derivative of the successful
efforts method. In total, 52 constituents responded to the Issues Paper, however
only 46 respondents commented on this issue. Their preferences are summarised in
Table 1.
*Insert Table 1 here*
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In the Issues Paper, the IASC made visible its preference for a single method of
accounting for pre-production activities consistent with the successful efforts
method. As indicated in Table 1, 78 percent of respondents indicated a preference
for the successful efforts method or its derivative, the area of interest method. The
remaining 22 percent of respondents argued for retention of choice between the
successful efforts and full cost methods. The majority of constituents arguing for
retention of the full cost method were oil and gas companies or petroleum industry
lobby groups. This was consistent with the greater use of the full cost method by
petroleum companies and their industry’s historic domination of the full cost versus
successful efforts debate (Van Riper 1994). The visible influences and input can be
summarised as follows: the IASC put forward an Issues Paper indicating a
preference for a single method of accounting for pre-production activities consistent
with the successful efforts method, and 78 percent of public submissions
commenting on this issue agreed with the proposal of the IASC. Based on the
visible inputs to the standard setting process, it would be reasonable to expect the
issuance of an IFRS requiring successful efforts accounting. However, the
accounting standard, IFRS 6, Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources,
that was issued in 2004 and effective from 1 January 2006, did not take any position
on the successful efforts versus full cost issue and instead permitted a continuation
of a choice between methods. In other words, the standard codified existing
accounting practice for extractive industries entities and in a manner reminiscent of
the FASB and its failed Statement No. 19, the IASB has been unable to achieve a
narrowing of accounting alternatives for the extractive industries. This result leads
to the questioning of why the IASB acted, or declined to act, in this way. The black
box provides one explanation of this outcome as the result of covert or “unseen”
13

influences occurring behind the scenes in the standard setting process (Hodges and
Mellett 2002; 2008). An examination of the political and economic power of
extractive industries entities and the relative resource dependency of the IASB lends
weight to the inference that the IASB’s due process could be covertly influenced by
powerful constituents.

3.1 The extractive industries

The extractive industries represent a significant share of global capital, and include
many of the world’s largest companies such as ExxonMobil, the Royal Dutch/Shell
Group, and BP plc. The economic strength of the major extractive industries
companies is such that many are richer and more powerful than the states and even
countries that seek to regulate them (Global Policy Forum 2006). Table 2 presents
the top twenty extractive industries companies, drawn from the Fortune 500 Top
Global Companies list for 2006iii.
*Insert Table 2 here*
As shown in Table 2, in combination, these twenty extractive industries companies
Deleted: tr

recorded revenues in 2005 of $2,123 billion and profits of $211 billion. Comparing

Deleted: t
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the combined revenues of these global companies with United States Gross
Domestic Product of US$11 trillion (World Bank 2005) gives some perspective of
the enormous economic strength of these major international entities.

The political influence of this sector flows on from its economic strength.
Extractive industries coalitions have been active lobbyists in regulatory debates
concerning issues such as global climate change, taxation policy, and sustainable
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development, with many, such as the American Petroleum Institute, formed
specifically for the purpose of influencing public policy and regulatory processes
for the benefit of over 400 members (American Petroleum Institute 2006). As
individual companies, extractive industries entities are very powerful; as a group,
their collective strength increases exponentially. Most of the companies that
responded individually to the Issues Paper were also members of one or both of the
major industry coalitions that responded: the American Petroleum Institute, and the
Oil Industry Accounting Committee (see Table 1). Further, instead of responding
individually, hundreds of members companies chose to have their voice heard
through their industry coalition. Interestingly, both of these extremely powerful
coalitions fervently supported the retention of choice.

In terms of resource dependency, the IASB, operating under the not-for-profit
banner of the IASC Foundation (IASCF), is financially supported by private
contributions from chartered accounting firms and business enterprises
internationally (IASCF 2002). In 2006, the year IFRS 6 came into effect, the IASC
Foundation received contributions totalling over US$16,000,000 from 283
corporations, associations, and other institutions, including a number of the world’s
leading multinational corporations (IASCF 2003). Table 3 lists mining, oil and gas
companies, and other relevant constituents who have provided financial support to
the IASC/IASB since the extractive industries project was initiated in 1998.
*Insert Table 3 here*

Many of the financial supporters listed in Table 3 were also respondents to the
Issues Paper, as indicated in Table 1 and are some of the world’s largest companies.
15

It is questionable whether the IASB’s funding arrangements result in democratic
and unbiased standard setting given that the rule-maker is being financed by those it
intends to rule. At the very least a dependency relationship is established between
the IASB and its benefactors which may see the marginalisation of critical issues,
such as environmental accounting, in favour of issues that align with the
preferences of finance providers (Brown and Shardlow 2005; Brown 2006).
Approximately 60 percent of the IASB’s 2006 funding was received from the Big
4iv accounting firms, making this group of benefactors a significant provider of
financial resources to the IASB, and therefore in a considerable position of power
over the IASB (Carpenter and Feroz 2001). In turn, these Big 4 firms earn part of
their revenue from extractive industries companies in exchange for audit and
consultancy services.

In addition to the financial contributions, other resources provided by extractive
industries companies to the IASC included personnel, with three extractive
industries companies represented on the Steering Committee which was responsible
for the development of the Issues Paper and the eventual IFRS. The inclusion of
extractive industries representatives in the accounting standard setting process is, of
course, reasonable given the specialised training and expertise required of personnel
such as engineers, geologists and surveyors. However, it does provide another
avenue through which the regulatory process is outsourced to those to be regulated.
These layers of covert influence permeate the international accounting standard
setting process so insidiously that they are not raised as potential reasons for
particular outcomes, or in this case non-outcomes. In the context of the black box,
it is possible that the process of setting IFRS6 has been influenced by unseen
16

countervailing forces that have been of equal or greater significance than those
represented by the written submissions.

4. Concluding comments

The attempts of the IASC to address the disparity in extractive industries
accounting has provided an opportunity to revisit the successful efforts versus full
cost debate that had plagued the sector since the 1960s when the US standard setter
sought to eliminate full cost accounting by the oil and gas industry. When IFRS 6
was eventually issued by the IASB 2004, the existing and flexible accounting
practices were not only allowed to continue, they were codified into an international
accounting standard. This lack of action on the part of the IASB was in contrast to
the visible submissions made by constituents in response to the Issues Paper in
which the majority (78 percent) supported the IASC’s proposal to incorporate only
the successful efforts method into an international accounting standard for the
extractive industries. The “black box” metaphor facilitates consideration of this
accounting standard setting process, providing a way to view the input and output at
the same time as considering the influences that may infiltrate the process to affect
the outcomes (Hodges and Mellett 2008). While some of these influences will be
visible, such as the comments letters, and their effects will be visible in the
outcomes, the hidden or unseen influences must also be recognised as at least or
perhaps more influential than the overt ones, and they are identifiable by their
“footprints” left on the outcome (Hodges and Mellett 2008, 18). In the case of the
extractive industries, one explanation for the inaction of the IASB is the “invisible”
influence of the major players in the standard setting process. Analogous to the US
17

situation in the 1960s, the successful efforts versus full cost issue has now been
raised and unresolved at the international level.

A limitation of this research also presents an opportunity for further research. A
valuable extension of this research would be assessing the standard setting process
as a participant observer. While publicly available information has the advantage of
offering relatively unproblematic access, gaining an “insider” perspective would
add important insights to the research findings and overcome the limitation of
inference that comes with this research. Ultimately, presented in this paper is only
a hypothesised version of what may have influenced the standard setting process.
Until more in depth research is conducted and the black box actually penetrated,
alternative hypotheses, such as the timing constraints and politics associated with
the move to harmonisation, may also provide valid explanations for the outcome of
this standard setting process.

Other aspects of the extractive industries project may also be explored using the
research approach and theoretical framework developed in this research. A
pertinent and timely issue for the extractive industries concerns accounting for
removal and restoration expenses, which is an area of substantial accounting
flexibility. This area is also likely to be of interest to many and varied stakeholder
groups including extractive industries companies, environmental groups, and nongovernment organisations. The black box concept could also be applied to other
topics, such as intangibles or not-for-profit entities, both of which have been
dropped from the active agenda of the IASB. While the politicisation of accounting
standard setting is widely acknowledged, the revelation that economically dominant
18

groups can covertly wield such power is a sobering one in the light of the
worldwide promotion and adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards.
i

A derivative of the successful efforts method, known as the Area of Interest method, was developed
by Australian accounting standard setters in the 1970s. This method allows costs to be capitalised
when they relate to a successful venture, which is defined within a specific area of interest such as a
single mine or a separate oil or gas field (Australian Accounting Standards Board, 1989).
ii
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) was formed in 2001. Its predecessor, the
International Accounting Standards Committee, was initially responsible for adding the extractive
industries project to its agenda,
iii
Fortune 500 provides an annual list of the world’s largest companies according to revenue, profit,
stockholders’ equity, assets, and number of employees.
iv
The Big 4 professional accounting firms include PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu, KPMG, and Ernst & Young. At the time the Issues Paper was first proposed, Andersen
was another major international accounting firm that comprised part of the (then) Big 5.
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Figure 1. The Black Box of accounting standard setting
(Adapted from Hodges and Mellett, 2008)

Table 1: Extractive industries constituents and preferred accounting treatment
Constituent
Location
Primary activity
Preferred treatment
American Petroleum Institute
US
Industry lobby group
Retention of choice
Anglo American Platinum Corporation Limited
South Africa Mining company
Successful efforts
Anglo American plc
UK
Mining company
Successful efforts
Anglo Gold Limited
South Africa Mining company
Successful efforts
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants
UK
Professional body
Successful efforts
Australasian Joint Ore Reserves Committee
Australia
Professional body
Area of interest
Australian Gold Council
Australia
Professional body
Area of interest
Balfour Holding Inc
US
Engineering firm
No response
BHP Limited (now BHP Billiton)
Australia
Mining company
Area of interest
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
Canada
Professional body
Retention of choice
Conoco Inc.
US
Petroleum company
Successful efforts
Conoco Inc.
US
Petroleum company
Successful efforts
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International
Intl
Accounting firm
Successful efforts
Dr Geoff Frost/Ms Martine Hardy
Australia
Academic
No response
ENI
Italy
Petroleum company
Successful efforts
Enterprise Oil plc
UK
Petroleum company
Successful efforts
Esso Imperial Oil (subsidiary of ExxonMobil)
Canada
Petroleum company
Retention of choice
Exxon Mobil Corporation
US
Petroleum company
Successful efforts
FACPCE
Argentina
Professional body
Successful efforts
Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens Europe
Professional body
Successful efforts
Föreningen Auktoriserade Revisorer
Sweden
Professional body
No response
Gold Fields Limited
South Africa Mining company
Area of interest
Goldfields Limited
Australia
Mining company
Area of interest
Group of 100
Australia
Lobby group
Successful efforts
Inst of Chartered Acc in England & Wales
UK
Professional body
Retention of choice
Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer
Germany
Professional body
No response
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia
Australia
Professional body
Successful efforts
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan
Pakistan
Professional body
Successful efforts
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Zimbabwe Zimbabwe
Professional body
Successful efforts
International Valuations Standards Committee
UK
Professional body
No response
Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants Japan
Professional body
No response
John S Herold Inc
US
Engineering firm
Successful efforts
Kenneth Arne
Kazakhstan Individual
Area of interest
Kerr-McGee North Sea (UK) Limited
UK
Petroleum company
Retention of choice
KPMG International
Intl
Accounting firm
Retention of choice
Melrose Resources Plc
UK
Petroleum company
Retention of choice
Minerals Council of Australia
Australia
Industry lobby group
Area of interest
Normandy Mining Limited
Australia
Mining company
Successful efforts
Paladin Resources plc
UK
Petroleum company
Retention of choice
PetroChina Company Limited
China
Petroleum company
Successful efforts
PricewaterhouseCoopers
South Africa Accounting firm
Area of interest
PricewaterhouseCoopers
Australia
Accounting firm
Retention of choice
Professor Terry Heazlewood
Australia
Academic
Successful efforts
Rio Tinto
UK
Mining company
Successful efforts
RWE - DEA AG
Germany
Utilities provider
Successful efforts
RWE AG
Germany
Utilities provider
Successful efforts
RWE Rheinbraun AG
Germany
Utilities provider
Successful efforts
Sasol Mining Limited
South Africa Mining company
Successful efforts
South African Chamber of Mines
South Africa Industry lobby group
Area of interest
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants South Africa Professional body
Area of interest
UK Oil Industry Accounting Committee
UK
Industry lobby group
Retention of choice
Woodside Petroleum Ltd.
Australia
Petroleum company
Successful efforts
Total respondents
52
Total respondents to specific issue
46
Total respondents preferring retention of choice
10 (22%)
Total respondents preferring successful efforts
26 (56%)
10 (22%)
Total respondents preferring area of interest
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Table 2: Top 20 extractive industries companies according to industry, country, revenues and profit
Fortune
500 Rank Company
1
3
4
6
10
12
27
39
64
70
77
86
105
115
118
120
153
195
196

Exxon Mobil*
Royal Dutch/Shell Group
British Petroleum plc
Chevron (now ChevronTexaco)
ConocoPhillips* (formerly Conoco Inc)
TOTAL
ENI*
China National Petroleum
E.ON
Statoil
Marathon Oil
Petrobrás
RWE*
Lukoil
Nippon Oil
Petronas
Indian Oil
BHP Billiton plc*
Anglo American plc*

Industry
Petroleum refining
Petroleum refining
Petroleum refining
Petroleum refining
Petroleum refining
Petroleum refining
Petroleum refining
Petroleum refining
Energy
Petroleum refining
Petroleum refining
Petroleum refining
Energy
Petroleum refining
Petroleum refining
Petroleum refining
Petroleum refining
Mining, crude oil
Mining, crude oil

Revenues
2005
Profits 2005
($ millions) ($ millions)
US
339,938
36,130
Netherlands
306,731
25,311
UK
267,600
22,341
US
189,481
14,099
US
166,683
13,529
France
152,361
15,250
Italy
92,603
10,920
China
83,557
12,950
Germany
66,313
9,204
Norway
61,033
4,769
US
58,958
3,032
Brazil
56,324
10,344
Germany
50,346
2,772
Russia
46,284
6,443
Japan
45,071
1,471
Malaysia
44,280
11,565
India
36,537
1,115
Australia
29,587
6,398
UK
29,434
3,521
Total
2,123,121
211,164
Country

* Responded to the Extractive Industries Issues Paper, as indicated in Table 1
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Constituent
Anderson
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu*
Ernst & Young
KPMG*
PricewaterhouseCoopers*

Table 3: Constituents providing financial support to the IASC/IASB 1998-2006
Nature of annual
contribution
Industry
Year of contribution
US$1m
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Accounting
Accounting
US$1m - US$1.5m 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Accounting
US$1m - US$1.5m 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Accounting
US$1m - US$1.5m 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Accounting
US$1m - US$1.5m 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

AngloAmerican plc*
Mining
Supporter
BHP Billiton plc*
Mining
Supporter
British Petroleum plc
Underwriter
Petroleum
Conoco Inc (now ConocoPhillips)*
Supporter
Petroleum
ENI*
Supporter
Petroleum
E.ON
Energy
Underwriter
Exxon Mobil Corporation*
Supporter
Petroleum
Supporter
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.
Petroleum
Rio Tinto*
Supporter
Mining
RWE AG*
Energy
Underwriter
Royal Dutch/Shell Group
Petroleum
Underwriter
Texaco (now ChevronTexaco)
Petroleum
Supporter
TOTAL*
Petroleum
Underwriter
* Responded to Extractive Industries Issues Paper, as indicated in Table 1

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2002
1998 1999
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2003 2004
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1998 1999
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

2005
2005
2005
2005

2006
2006
2006
2006

2005
2005
2005 2006

2005 2006
2005
2005 2006
2006
2005 2006
2005 2006
2005
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